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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----~-----~-~--~------~--~--------------~-----------------------

THOMAS C. MABEY and LOUISE S.
MABEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,:
Defendant and Appellant.

--------------------------------------

:

Case No.

18338

WASATCH CABINET COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

---------------------------------------------------------------NATURE OF THE CASE
The case at bar concerns those transactions involving
the construction of a home by defendant and appellant herein,
Kay Peterson Constructio·n Company, Inc., and the purchase of that
home by plaintiffs and respondents herein, Thomas and Louise Mabey.
Various subcontractors, suppliers and materialmen filed liens
on unpaid accounts arising out of the home's construction.
Plaintiffs, Thomas and Louise Mabey, filed suit against defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Kay ·Peterson Construction Company, Inc. for breach of contract
for defendant's failure to satisfy the outstanding liens, and
further for defendant's failure to complete the home in a
quality workmanlike manner.

Defendant counterclaimed alleging

breach of contract and seeking reformation.
Upon joint and unopposed motions the actions filed by
lien claimants were consolidated with the action at bar.
Plaintiffs compromised the lien claims, leaving present plaintiffs
and defendant identifi.ed above as the only parties to the action.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried without a jury before the
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge in the Second Judicial District
Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah.

The Court

rendered judgment for plaintiffs on plaintiffs' causes of action,
awarding plaintiffs that amount paid to compromise the outstanding
liens together with interest and attorney's fees, and awarding
plaintiffs $5,400.00 as and for damages arising from defects in
construction.

The Court also rendered judgment for defendant

in that amount prayed for by defendant based upon relief for a
mutual mistake of fact.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek affirmation of the Court's Judgment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in favor of plaintiffs on their causes of action.

Plaintiffs

further seek reversal of the Court's Judgment in favor of
defendant based upon an alleged mutual mistake of fact, or in
the alternative that the Court's Order be affirmed in its
entirety.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The subject transactions arose in respect to theo
construction, sale and purchase of a home on Lot

of the

Indian Springs Subdivision located at 3604 South Canyon Estates
Drive, Bountiful, in Davis County, State of Utah.

Kay Peterson

Construction Company began construction, following discussions
regarding plans with Tom Mabey, a civil engineer, in the fall
of 1979, and the home was nearly complete by late March 1980.
Although Mr. Mabey and the firm he was previously
employed with had been consulted by the defendant respecting
prior residential construction, Mr. Mabey was more involved in
this particular project than on prior occasions (T-40-42).
Mr. Mabey was involved in the modification of floor plans; he
performed various services and purchased materials for the home,
such as insulation and plumbing; and both Mabeys had input
into sundry aspects of finishing work, such as selection of
paint colors and cabinet design.
During the course of construction there were no clear
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

or defined contractual arrangements between the parties.
Mr. Mabey testified that his understanding was that the
defendant was building the home on speculation, that is, without

a definite buyer and speculating that a buyer would be found
after construction (T-36-38).

Mr. Mabey also testified that

he had affirmatively represented to the defendant that he was
not committed and would not commit himself to the purchase of
the home during·that time (T-26, 36).

Mr. Mabey also testified

that it was his understanding that if the Mabeys did not purchase the home, they would be reimbursed for materials and
services they had contributed to the home (T-25-26).

On or

about March 20, 1980 defendant did sign a written memorandum
(Pl. Ex. 0)

eviden~ing

an agreement that if the Mabeys did not

purchase the home, they would be reimbursed a certain sum of
money they had contributed toward the purchase of materials for
the home.
That same memorandum, dated March 20, 1980, signed by
the defendant and admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit
0, also provided that if the Mabeys did purchase the home, said
certain sum would be

11

applied toward the Mabeys' purchase of

same said lot and dwelling unit (total estimated cost to date
is $134,068.40).

11

Construction was, at that time, very near

completion and the Mabeys made efforts to obtain financing
such that they could purchase the home.

Between the 20th and
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25th day of March, 1980 there was some discussion and negotiation
between these parties (Plaintiff's testimony T-26; Defendant's
T-115, 116, 88) regarding the terms of the sale and purchase.
On March 25, 1981 plaintiffs and defendant entered into
a written contract, in form of a standard Earnest Money Receipt
with hand vJritten and initialed modifications.

This "Earnest

Money Contract 11 specifically provided, inter alia, that in no
event shall the "total cost exceed $109,000.00 unless agreed
upon in writing by both buyer and seller" (Pl. Ex. C).

The

figure of $109,000.00 was arrived at from deducting the price of
the Tot, $27,000.00, from the total estimated cost of $134,068.40,
with an approximate $2,000.00 buffer for incidental expenses
to final completion.

The Earnest Money Contract specifically

did not include conveyance or consideration for the lot upon
which the home was constructed.
The lot, upon which the home was built, was acquired
by the Mabeys through separate transactions, through an
individual, a Mr. Jerry James.

The essence of such transactions

was that pursuant to other dealings and transactions not relevant
to the case at bar,

Mr. James acquired the lot and conveyed

same to the Mabeys.

In all, Kay Peterson Construction did in

fact recover the full cost of the lot, as testified to by
Mr. Peterson (T-86, 116), some $27,000.00.
After closing of the sale a number of .subcontractors
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and materialmen filed liens against the home on unpaid accounts
arising out of construction of the home.

Mabeys then filed

an action against defendant and subsequently cross-claimed in
the action brought by the subcontractors and materialmen.
lien claims, the action by Mabeys and the counterclaim

The

again~t

Mabeys by defendant were consolidated.
Subsequent to consolidation, the Mabeys obtained a
loan from Zion's First National Bank in order to settle and
compromise the claims of the lienholders, and in fact the Mabeys
did compromise claims totalling approximately $13,464.00 fpr
$9,738.70.

To facilitate that compromise the Mabeys were

required to obtain a loan at current interest rates.
The matter was tried without a jury before the Honorable

J. Duffy Palmer.

The Court ruled that there had been a mutual

mistake of fact and awarded defendant that amount originally
demanded by defendant in counterclaim.

The Court awarded

judgment to the Mabeys for the amount expended by them to
satisfy the unpaid lien claims, together with damages for the
interest they paid on the loan in respect thereto and attorneys'
fees.
The Court further ruled that

~s

respects plaintiffs'

claims for defects and the failure to complete construction in
a quality workmanlike manner, the plaintiffs were awarded
$5,400.00 in damages unless the defendant were to go in and
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correct the defects to the satisfaction of the Department of
Contractors for the State of Utah within thirty (30) days. The
defendant was effectively granted the option of repairing the
work to the satisfaction of a non-interested third party, or
paying the plaintiffs the sum of $5,400e00 in damages (T-132).
Subsequent ta trial defendant made no effort to correct
existing defects for a period well in excess of thirty .days.
Defendant filed objections to proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and after hearing Court entered said findings
and conclusions as submitted.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PLAINTIFFS
DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLETE
CONSTRUCTION IN A QUALITY WORKMANLIKE MANNER.
Mr. Mabey testified that he is a professional and
licensed civil engineer.

He testified further to experience

in residential construction including prior projects involving
the defendant (T-13-14), and experience in analysis of
management cost evaluation (T-32).

His direct involvement in

the construction of this home is well documented in the record
and testimony at trial, and his familiarity with the home is
of course obvious as owner and occupant since completion.
Mr. Mabey identified, by reference to a list set forth
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on two exhibits

(Pl~

Ex. Hand I), a number of deficiencies

and defects he discovered in the home's construction.

He

further testified that he was familiar with hourly rates of
individuals who would be qualified to repair the identified
·defects, and that he had estimated total costs of repairing·
said defects based upon hourly rates averaging $17.00 per hour,
some $8.00 per hour less than the rate Mr. Mabey understood the
defendant to charge (T-32-35).

Mr. Mabey estimated that total

cost of repair would be approximately $5,400.00.
Defendant did not offer tnto evidence any rebuttal as
to the nature ·or cause of the defects, nor as to cost of
repairing same.

Defendant's counsel did object to the qualifi-

cations of Mr. Mabey to testify on these issues and was
overruled by the

Court~

presumably on the basis of the

credentials and experience already described (T-32-34).
Defendant's counsel did cross-examine Mr. Mabey as to particular defects identified

(T~68-72).

The testimony of Mr. Mabey, given his credentials,
prior experience and direct knowledge of this particular
project, constituted competent evidence and established a
reasonable basis to support
this matter.

the trial court's findings tn

It has long been the policy of this Court to

not disturb the findings of the trial court if there is a
reasonable basis in evidence to support such findings,
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Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, at 500 (Utah 1976).

The

testimony presented at trial satisfies the standards noted
in the authorities cited by defendant (Appellant's Brief,
25-29):

Mr. Mabey's testimony did present evidence upon which

the trial court could find, with reasonable certainty, both
the basis for and amount of damages.
The Utah Suoreme Court

ha~

previously s_tated:

Damages are not to be denied simply because
they cannot be ascertained with exactness.
If a reasonable basis of calculation is
afforded, it is sufftcient although the
result is only approximate. Security Development Company v. Fedco, 23 Utah 2d 306,
462 P.2d 706 (1969)9
The evidence presented in the case at bar certainly falls within
these parameters, and the trial court's findings are supported
by said, unrebutted, testimony and evidence.
The defendant further challenges the sufficiency of
evidence on this issue in what is apparently an attack on the
credibility of Mr. Mabey's testimony (see Appellant's Brief
29- 31 ) , ref e r r i n g to the '' s us pe ct an d un cert a i n n a tu re o f the
testimony presented concerning the amount of claimed damages.
(App. Brief 29) and further asserting that "No evidence of any
kind was presented to show the cause of the alleged defects
or to connect or link them to the Defendant Kay Peterson
Construction.

11

(App. Brief 31).

On the contrary, Mr. Mabey,

a professional and licensed civil engineer with credentials and
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II

experience noted above and with extensive personal knowledge of
this project, testified that there were certain defects and
deficiencies in the home's construction, and said testimony
was in no way rebutted.

Assessment of the credibility of his

testimony is a matter entirely within the sound discretion
of the trial court and certianly should not be disturbed upon
appeal, especially where no rebuttal evidence was presented
in the trial court.
The defendant's final challenge to the trial court's
findings regarding damages arising out of defects and deficiencies
in construction, appears to be an assertion that the trtal
court was unduly and improperly influenced by representations
as to proceedings before the State Department of Contractors
and documents presented in respect thereto (App. Brief 32-33).
Defendant proffers that the trial court "believed the "Correction
Report" (Pl. Ex. I) to be a prior adj udi ca ti on by the State
Board of Contractors for the liability of the Defendant Kay
Peterson Construction for repair of the items listed on the
report •

11

(App. Brief 32), and further that "the lower

court limited the scope of examination and sustained objections
to testimony and evidence apparently in reliance on that belief."
(App. Brief 32).
The trial court's position in this regard could
hardly be more misconstrued.

The exchanges between the trial
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court and counsel, and the rulings as regards testimony and
evidence, referred to in Appellant's Brief pages 32 and 33,
considered in context clearly indicate that the trial court's
position was that the plaintiffs were precluded from
proceeding on any defects other than those identified on
palintiffs Exhibit I and that defendant's counsel was precluded from

c~oss-examination

regarding other alleged defects

because such defects were not in issue, and that such
examination was irrelevant and in the interest of time would
not be allowed.
11

The trial court's "belief" as respects the

Correction Report", Plaintiffs' Exhibit I, is most clearly

indicated in the trial court's ruling that said exhibit was
admitted for

11

informational

11

purposes only and not as proof

of the substance recited therein (T-73).
In this regard, the trial court did not limit defendant's
cross-examination of Mr. Mabey as respects defects identified
on the "Correction Report"; nor did the trial court deny
admission of evidence or testimony that would rebut the
existence of said defects, as there was, indeed, no such
testimony or evidence proffered.
The testimony and evidence presented constituted
competent evidence and establishes a reasonable basis to
support the findings of the trial court as to damages arising
from defects in construction, and said findings should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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upheld upon review.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PLAINTIFF THE
COST OF SATISFYING UNPAID LIENS AGAINST THE
HOME AND COSTS INCLUDING INTEREST AND A
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE.
The "Purchase Money Contract" specifically provided, in
writing, for the recovery of costs and

a~torney's

event of a breach (Pl. Ex. C, 1. 47-48).

fees in the

The trial court

found, upon competent and sufficient evidence·, that the defendant
had breached the contract in two respects: failure to complete
construction in a quality workmanlike fashion and the defendant's
failure to satisfy obligations owing to subcontractors and
materialmen.

In respect-to the latter, the plaintiffs obtained

a loan at current interest rates in order to compromise said
claims, and thereby clear their title to the subject property,
and

in fact did settle claims in excess of $13,400.00 for the

consideration of approximately $9,737.00.

Defe~dant

offered

no testimony or evidence rebutting either allegation of breach
of contract.
De fen dan t , howe ve r , o ff e rs a no ve 1 the o r y t o ch a 11en ge
the trial court's judgment granting recovery of the cost of
satisfying the unpaid liens, including interest, and a
reasonable attorney's fee (see App. Brief 20-25); arguing
that defendant was entitled to reformation of the contract,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that consequently plaintiffs failed to tender the total price
and therefore defendant's failure to satisfy subcontractors,
suppliers and materialmen did not constitute a breach of the
contract.

Such analysis is fatally flawed in at least two

respects.
First, the trial court clearly determined that the
defendant did breach the contract in the two respects noted
above, and the record reflects that said findings were based
on competent, substantial and sufficient evidence.

On that

basis, and pursuant to the specific terms of the written
contract providing for recovery of cost and attorney's fees as
against the breaching party, the court was acting properly
and within its discretion in awarding plaintiffs such costs,
i n c 1 u d i n g i n th·i s i n s t a n c e t h e h i gh e r i n t e re s t r a t e i n c u r re d i n
clearing title, and attorney's fees as were reasonable.
Secondly, as regards defendant's contentions pursuant
to a reformed contract, as defendant would have it reformed,
prayer for reformation invokes the trial court's equity
jurisdiction and thus accords the trial court wide discretion in
formulating a just and proper remedy.

The trial court did not,

pursuant to such equity jurisdiction, relieve

th~

defendant of

paying costs and attorney's fees arising out of defendant's
failure to complete construction in a quality workmanlike fashion
and defendant's failure to satisfy subcontractors and materialmen.
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The policy of the Utah Supreme Cout, in equity cases, has been
often and clearly stated, as in Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452
(Utah 1975) where, at 454, it is stated that·
. • . due to the advantaged position of the
trial court we will review its findings and
judgments with considerable indulgence, and
will not disagree with and upset them unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against
them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied
the law applicable thereto.
In all, the trial court's award of costs and attorney's
fees was proper and within its discretion, and should not be
disturbed upon appeal.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT TO
DEFENDANT BASED UPON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT ..
A.

THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE

THE TRIAL COURT.
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides

11

ln all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with

particularity~"

has been strictly interpreted and applied in cases where
reformation is sought by reason of mutual mistake.

Neely v.

Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979); and Battiston v. American
Land And Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980).

In

Neeley~

supra,

this Court stated:
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II

In the counterclaim, Kelsch did not set forth
with particularity any attack upon the deeds
based on mutual mistake. They only generally
asserted their ownership. In his opening
statement~ counsel for Kelsch did mention
mistake, but did not ask for an amendment of
the pleadings to properly put mistake before
the trial court. Therefore, the trial court
improperly heard parol evidence intended to
modify the deeds and thus should have only
examined the face of the deeds in resolvinq
the dispute. Neeley v. Kelsch 600 P.2.d 989(Utah 1979).
The court's analysis in Neeley, supra, is particularly
applicable to the case at bar.

Defendant herein did make

a general claim for reformation in counterclaim (Defendant's
Counterclaim, Second .Cause of Action, R-15), but nowhere
alleged that there was a mutual mistake underlying the execution
of the "Purchase Money Contract," and did not plead with
particularity circumstances constituting any such mistake.
Defendant's counsel did not even mention "mutual mistake" in
opening statements and did not move to amend pleadings to aver
mutual mistake.

During the course of trial plaintiffs' counsel

objected to testimony that would alter or contradict the terms
of the written agreement (see T-89-93, T-54-55, and Tll5-116).
Defendant's counsel did not, on occasion of said objections,
proffer "mutual mistake" as justifying an exception to the parol
evidence rule.
At best, defendant offered evidence that might indicate
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that defendant had made a mistake in preparing the project 1 s
cost estimate, and that said estimate was the basis for
negotiating the purchase price.

Defendant did not offer clear

and convincing evidence that such a unilateral mistake was
made, and defendant's counsel did not formally proffer the
"mutual mistake" theory for reformation unti 1 closing argument.
Indeed, very near the end of the trial, plaintiffs• counsel
objected to a line of questioning specifically on the ground
that that line of questioning was directed toward adding to or
contradicting the terms of the written agreement

(T-115-116).

Again, defendant's counsel did not proffer the mutual mistake
exception to the Parol Evidence Rule, and plaintiffs' objection
was sustained.
In all, the issue of mutual mistake was not properly
before the trial court, indeed it did not even appear to be
before the court at all until defendant's closing argument,
and therefore the trial court erred in awarding defendant
judgment based upon the alleged mutual mistake of fact.

B.

THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

TO PROVE, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT THERE HAD BEEN
A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.
In cases where reformation of a written instrument is
sought on the basis of a mutual mistake of fact, it is the firmly
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established rule that the party alleging reformation based on
mutual mistake has "the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a mutual mistake of fact.

11

Hatch v.

Bastian., 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977); Maytime Manor Inc. v.
Stakermatic, Inc., 597 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979).

In the case

at bar the evidence presented at trial at best indicates, and
not clearly or convincingly, that the defendant may have erred
in preparing the project cost estimate and that negotiations for
purchase price were based on that estimate.

In the absence

of a showing of fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party,
and no such conduct is herein in any way indicated, Utah case
law clearly states that "unilateral mistake is not a ground for
reformation." Ingram v. Forres, 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977).
The mistake here, if any, was defendant's and was not
mutual; indeed, plaintiffs merely relied on the representations
of defendant in'two distinct written instruments:

First, the

written agreement signed by defendant on March 20, 1980, indicating
a- total cost, including lot, of $134,0-68.40 (Pl. Ex. D). Secondly,

the "Purchase Money Contract 11 which on its face shows a total
purc~ase

price of

$109~000.00

for the tmprovements excluding

the lot (which was paid for, in the amount of $27,000.00, by
separate transaction), with specific reference to ·a project
cost estimate prepared by the defendant.
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C.

THE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVE, BY CLEAR AND CON-

VINCING EVIDENCE, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MISTAKE FOR WHICH THE
REMEDY OF REFORMATION WOULD BE PROPER.
The limited circumstances upon which a party may be
entitled to the remedy of reformation on the ground of mistake
are specifically cited by the Utah Court in Jensen v. Manila
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565
P.2d 63 (Utah 1977), at 64, as follows:
The power to obtain the reformation of a
written instrument exists when it can be.
satisfactorily proved (1) that the instrument,
as made failed to conform to what both parties
intended; or (2) that the claiming party was
mistaken as to its actual content and the
other party, knowing of this mistake, kept
silent; or (3) that the claiming party was
mistaken as to actual content because of
fraudulent affirmative behavior.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the circumstances
in subsection (3) above would apply to the action at bar.

The

case at bar clearly does not fall within subsection (2) above
either, for there is no indication whatsoever, in the record or
testimony at trial, that plaintiffs knew of the alleged mistake
and kept silent; indeed, the plaintiffs could do no more than
rely on the representations of defendant as to the costs defendant
had incurred in construction of the home.
Thus, in order for defendant to prevail on the claim for
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reformation, it was necessary that the defendant establish, by
clear and convincing evidence (See citations in Point III-B
above), "that the instrument, as made failed to conform to what
both parties intended."

Jensen, supra (emphasis added).

th:i s. con t e x t , t h e Uta h Co u rt a 1 s o s ta t e d th e re i n th a t

11

In

We do n o t

rewrite the contract, we merely allow the writing to be made to
conform, to the contract as made.

11

Jensen, supra, at 65.

The irony of defendant's claim on this issue is that
defendant does not clearly set forth what it purports to have
been the contract as intended; nowhere in the record or in the
testimony of any witness at trial, is there support for the
position that plaintiffs intended to enter a contract to purchase
the home for $127,000.00, exlcuding the lot.

Nowhere in the

record or testimony at trial is there support for the proposition
that plaintiffs would have purchased the home, or could have
even found financing that was crucial to their being able to
purchase the home, if the price of $127,000.00, excluding lot,
had been demanded.

In sum. there is no support in the record or

testimony, for the proposition that the Mabeys, plaintiffs,
intended to enter a contract for the purchase of the home except
upon a the specific and wri;tten terms set forth in the "Purchase
Money Contract, 11 where it set forth a purchase price based upon
a total cost not to exceed $109,000.00.
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That was the contract as written and signed by the
parties on March 25, 1980, and the record and testimony does
not show that plaintiffs intended to enter any other contract
than that.

Indeed, just five days prior the defendant signed

another written agreement (Pl . Ex. D) representing two very
significant facts:

First, recognition that plaintiffs were

not committed to the purchase of the home at that time.
Secondly, that the total cost of the home, including the lot
which cost $27,000.00, was approximately $134,068.00.
Not only has defendant failed to proffer clear and
convincing evidence that the intended contract was any other
than what the written "Purchase Money Contract
specifie~,

11

(Pl. Ex. C)

the evidence and testimony presented clearly

preponderates against a finding that both parties intended a
contract differing in terms from the written instrument.

The

weight of the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the
proposition that the intended contract was identical to the
written contract:

a purchase price of

$136~000.00

with the

lot included, or $109,000.00 not including the lot.

D. THERE WAS NO MISTAKE.
The ultimate irony in defendant's prayer for reformation
by way of conterclaim is that defendant asserts that the contract
should be reformed to recite a purchase price of $127,000.00,
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excluding the lot, when the record, and evidence and testimony
presented at trial, clearly, unequivocally and convincingly
establishes thatthe contract was a cost plus contract with a
maximum ceiling.

The defendant offered no evidence to show

that the costs of contruction incurred in building the subject
home exceeded $109,000.00 excluding the lot.

At best, defendant

offered the testimony of an employee, Mrs. Squires, as to the
records that were utilized in compiling the project cost
estimate that served as the basis for negotiating the ceiling
purchase price (T-94-113) and that she did not account for the
price of the lot when

co~piling

that estimate, and Mr. Kay

Peterson testified that he mistakenly agreed to deduct the full
$27,000.00 lot price from the total estimated cost of $136,000.00.
It must be noted that Mrs. Squires was an employee for
less than three months out of that period in excess of five
months during which the home was constructed (T-95), and thus
could not possibly have personal knowledge as to whether all
the records she referred to in the file on the subject home
represented actual costs incurred in building that home.

Secondly,

she testified that she did not personally record or complete
the information noted in defendant's Exhibits 4 through 10
(T-105)~

and thus she could have no personal knowledge of

whether the information contained therein referred to actual
costs incurred in the construction of the subject home.
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Finally,

neither Mrs. Squires nor Mr. Kay Peterson nor any one else
testified that those draws, disbursements or invoices, whether
in part or in whole, recorded actual costs incurred in cons t r uc t i ng th a t hom e p u r ch a s 'e d by th e p 1a i n t i ff s .

I n s ho rt ,

the testimony presented by the defendant indicates a sum of
draws and disbursements against the proceeds of financing
obtained for the purpose of constructing the subject home, but
does not even purport to indicate, as there was no testimony
presented on the matter, whether or what part of those draws
and disbursements went toward the actual costs of constructing
the subject home or some other project of the defendant.
On cross-examination it was clearly brought out that
the best Mrs. Squires would testify to wa$ that many of the
draws and disbursements went directly to subcontractors, suppliers
and materialmen (T-111-113); but she could not testify that the
services or supplies, or what part of them, went into the subject
home's construction, except as to two of defendant's twelve
exhibits on this; she testified that she could say that "most
of probably exhibit 11, 12 11 went into the house (T-109).
To sum up this point, there is no showing in the record
or in the evidence presented at trial, that the actual costs of
constructing this home ever exceeded $109,000.00; indeed, there
is no proof submitted as to what the actual costs were with any
degree of certainty or specificity.

Thus, there was no showing
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that there was a mistake at all in the execution of the subject
contract.

POINT IV
EVEN IF REFORMATION IS AWARDED, DEFENDANT'S
MAXIMUM RECOVERY IS LIMTED TO $11,037.47 OR
LESS.
The record, testimony and evidence at trial clearly
and unequivocally establishes that the sale and purchase contract
was a cost plus contract with a maximum ceiling.

Plaintiffs and

defendant only disagree, basically, as to what that
price was, not as to other terms.

11

ceiling 11

Plaintiffs urge that the

figure specified in the written contract was the agreed upon and
intended ceiling price ($109,000.00, excluding the lot); while
defendant urges that the ceiling price should be reformed to be
$127,000.00, excluding the lot.
Granting, for the moment, reformation as demanded by
defendant, while that may change the terms of the written contract
it does not result in any ground upon which the defendant can be
awarded any sum of money; the defendant nowhere has shown where
th e

11

co s t p Tus" a mo un t e x c e e d s $ 10 9 ,, 00 0 • 00 •

Th a t i s , th e de f e n d a n t

never did present adequate or competent evidence to show that
the actual costs incurred, plus the profit amount identified as
$8,500.00, ever exceeded the sum of $109,000.00.

(See discussion

on this point, analyzing the facts and evidence presented at
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trial, in Point III-C and D, above.)

Thus, the defendant never

did show entitlement to any sum more than that tendered by
plaintiffs.
Moreover,

defendant~

counterclaim alleges that plaintiffs

were credited with payments totalling $148,000.00, which included
payment for the lot (See Defendant's Counterclaim, Paragraph 14,
R-14), (the lot payment, in total, was $27 ,000.00; see T-86,
testimony of Mr. Kay Peterson).

No evidence or testimony was

presented at trial, one way or the other, as to the total sum
paid by plaintiffs, and thus the $148,000.00 figure must be assumed
as against that party, the defendant, so alleging.

Defendant

also alleged by way of counterclaim that the total costs incurred
in the construction of the home, including the lot, plus financing
and interest costs, and including the $8,500.00 profit amount,
totalled $159,037.47.

Defendant certainly never introduced

evidence tending to establish that "costs plus" were anywhere
near that amount (See Point III-C and D, supra.), but that is
also certainly the maximum amount defendant can now be heard to
claim was incurred.
The above figures lead to some curious conclusions.
First, if the contract were reformed as defendant would have it,
plaintiff~'

obligations would total $127,000.00 plus $27,000.00

for the lot, for a total of $154,000.00; crediting the plaintiffs'
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the $148,000.00 averred to in defendant's pleadings, that would
leave plaintiffs owing only $6,000.00 instead of the $11 ,037.47
awarded.

Even as against the entire $159,037.47 "cost plus"

figure plead by defendant, but not supported by the evidence,
crediting the plaintiffs the $148,000.00 averred to in defendant's
pleadings leaves the plaintiffs owing at most $11,037.47, and
then only if the contract is reformed to a "cost plus" contract
with no maximum ceiling (which is clearly contrary to the written
terms of the

11

Purchase Money Contract 11 ) .

Plaintiffs' counsel does not urge that the above figures
present an accurate picture of the subject transactions.

Indeed,

plaintiffs' counsel urges that the most accurate picture of the
subject transactions, including the intention of both parties,
is speci fi cal ly set forth on the face of the "Purchase Money
Contract" (Pl. Ex. C), which document is entirely consistent,
noting the $2,000.00 buffer for incidental costs to final completion added by Mr. Mabey, with the total cost including lot
figure cited in the March 20, 1980 agreement (See discussion
toward conclusion of Point III-C above) signed by defendant.
Plaintiffs' counsel does urge

respectfully~

that if the

Court determines that the defendant is entitled to reformation
of the contract based upon mistake or any other ground, that
defendant's recovery be limited to $6,000.00 the basis therefor
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noted aboVe, or in the alternative, the $11 ,037.47 awarded by
the trial court below.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs

proceeded in the action at bar upon two

causes of action arising out of defendant's failure to complete
construction in a quality workmanlike fashion and defendant's
failure to satisfy obligations owing to subcontractors and
materialmen resulting in liens against the purchased home.

At

trial plaintiffs presented competent and sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's findings that plaintiffs were entit1ed
to judgment on both causes of action, and sufficient to establish,
with reasonable certa i·nty, the amount of damages incurred.
the record and

Thus,

evidence presented at trial clearly support the

Court's Judgments in favor of plaintiffs, and said Judgments should
be upheld on review.
Defendant proceeded by way of counterclaim seeking
re f o rm a t i o n o f t h. e wr i t t e n

11

Pu r c has e Mo ne y Co n t r a c t .

11

I t is

upon this issue that the record and transcript of trial are
replete with confusion, vague generalities and inconsistencies.
Defendant's counsel did not proffer the mutual mistake theory
until closing argument; indeed, "mutual mistake 11 is not averred
in the pleadings, was not mentioned in opening remarks and was
not once raised as an issue against plaintiffs repeated objections
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to testimony that tended toward altering or contradicting the
terms of the written contract.

The transcript of trial nowhere

indicates that any testimony was received for the purpose of
contradicting the terms of the written contract by reason of
mutual mistake.

Two separate written agreements, both signed

by defendant, represent on their face that the total purchase
price, including lot, would be approximately $136,000.00, and
excluding the lot would be $109,000.00

(See Pl. Ex. C and D).

Finally, defendant did not proffer competent evidence nor the
testimony of any one with personal knowledge to establish just
what the actual cost of construction was or that it ever exceeded
$136,000.00 including the

l~t.

The defendant simply did not present sufficient evidence
to give the trial court grounds to reform the written instrument,
or even granting reformation,. to give the trial court grounds·
for awarding defendant any sum.of money.

Moreover, even granting

the defendant the reformation as sought, altering the terms of
the contract to $127,000.00 excluding the lot, comparing that
against defendant's pleadings where it is alleged that plaintiff
contributed a total of $148,000.00 toward the home, subtracting
the $27,000.00 lot price, that only leaves a difference of
$6,000.00, not $11 ,037.47 and not $18,000.00, owing to defendant
on the contract as defendant would have it reformed.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that judgments in their
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favor should be upheld; that the trial court 1 s finding of
mutual mistake and judgment awarded based thereon be reversed,
or in the alternative, that judgment for defendant thereon be
reduced to $6,000.00 or affirmed at $11 ,037.470
Respectfully submitted this

3'

day of July, 1982.
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